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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper investigates factors that affect gender-based differences in intra-household bargaining 
power that are reflected in consumption decisions regarding the adoption of green technology. 
Using data from the Indian Human Development Survey-II and a probit regression analysis, I 
find that increasing the level of a woman’s education (a proxy for increasing bargaining power) 
increases the likelihood of her household adopting LPG, the cleanest fuel option available. I also 
create an experimental design to serve as a next step for future research and target data collection 
on individual-level factors and environmental outcomes. The setup is for a potential intervention 
that assesses whether there are gender-based differences in the propensity for men and women to 
purchase improved cookstoves, given increased access to credit as a means to increase 
bargaining power in the household. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Engagement with climate mitigation and adaptation rests in the hands of actors at many 
differing levels of power and access to finance. This includes policymakers at the federal, state, 
and local levels; NGOs, and members of the household. The actors on the receiving end of policy 
interventions could adopt green technology at the industrial or the household level. In this paper, 
I will center discussion around the strategies that have been employed to combat climate change 
risks at the household level in rural regions of developing countries. I focus in particular on the 
role played by women in the adoption of improved, environmentally beneficial technology. More 
specifically, I aim to explore whether women or men in developing countries choose to invest in 
greener technologies when their bargaining power within the household is improved through 
increasing their access to credit. 
 Climate change arguably presents one of the largest threats to the stability of global 
institutions and society in the coming century, exacerbating a number of issues central to the 
broader development agenda as outlined by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These 
include (but are not limited to) the eradication of poverty, ensuring gender equality for women 
and girls, and ensuring environmental sustainability. The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) 
determined that at 1.5°C of global warming, risks to health, livelihoods, food security, access to 
water and sanitation, migration, and economic growth that are a direct result of climate 
variability and extreme weather events are projected to increase (IPCC, 2018).1 The report also 
notes that climate change is likely to increase the risk of displacement, particularly populations 
that lack the resources to adequately plan for and deal with migration – namely, low-income 
                                                 
1 The IPCC is an international scientific body whose legitimacy is built on its emphasis on conservative estimates of 
climate outcomes, has ascertained that there is little doubt that anthropogenic climate change (induced by human 
activity) is underway. The IPCC’s most recent report outlined the impacts of 1.5°C of global warming.  
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developing countries. In addition to this, low-income developing countries face increased risks of 
ill health and magnification of drivers of conflict, such as poverty and economic shocks. The 
report also notes that climate change impacts are expected to slow down economic growth, thus 
hindering poverty alleviation efforts, prolonging existing poverty traps, and creating new ones in 
developing countries. (IPCC AR5, 2018). 
 As noted in previous research, the populations who are exposed to increased risks of the 
most negative outcomes (as mentioned above) are those who are least equipped to cope 
effectively and in a timely manner – namely, those in developing countries and women (Smit et 
al., 2001; Adger et al., 2003). Thus, there is a need for concerted efforts on behalf of the public 
and private sectors on an international scale to address the threats posed by anthropogenic 
climate change (i.e., climate change induced by human activity) to these vulnerable populations. 
International multilateral organizations that provide funds and serve as facilitators of funding 
assess the most efficient ways that public and private capital can be allocated to engage in 
climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.2,3 
 Funding for initiatives and policy proposals that address climate change come from many 
sources, comprised of public, private, and market-based mechanisms. The ways in which the 
range of mechanisms under these three umbrellas are organized is referred to as the global 
climate finance architecture or regime. Actors within this framework include governments, 
                                                 
2 Climate mitigation change is defined by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) as “human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases” (UNFCCC 
2010). Examples would include increasing efficiency of fossil fuels during combustion, shifting energy reliance 
towards solar energy or wind power (reducing sources), and increasing afforestation efforts (increasing ‘sinks’ of 
carbon that remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere). 
3 Climate adaptation is understood as “adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected 
climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (UNFCCC 2010). With 
an eye towards implantation of development policy, Rodenberg (2009) also notes that adaptation can take place at 
different levels of society and be influenced by different groups of vulnerable actors, not just international 
policymakers and federal governments. 
Anand 
 
 
7 
private corporations (e.g. groups of experienced companies and financial intermediaries), 
international quasi-government institutions (UN agencies, multilateral development banks), and 
market- (e.g. carbon markets) and non-market mechanisms (e.g. subsidies). One example of 
many is the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), jointly established between the World Bank and 
regional multilateral development banks, has pledged approximately $6.5 billion towards 
investments focused on “energy efficiency, low-carbon and renewable energy carriers, pilot 
forest investments and new approaches to building climate resilience in vulnerable countries” 
(UNDP, 2011). One of the proposed strategies to tackle climate change and make vulnerable 
communities safer from future risk is encouraging the adoption of technologies that are cleaner 
and carry more environmental benefits. Thus, there is a need to ensure that this capital is being 
put towards policy interventions that have the potential to create the most economically and 
environmentally beneficial returns. 
 Women are often at the nexus of vulnerability to climate shock impacts and using their 
traditional roles in household management to mitigate those very impacts. Research shows that 
the benefits of adopting green technology could be unevenly concentrated on members of the 
household, particularly on women in the household – however, there is more work to be done in 
formalizing a general theory of adoption and use (Jeuland & Pattanayak, 2012). Recognizing 
this, policy briefs and analytical reports from multilateral organizations have begun to 
recommend focusing climate change financing mechanisms on promoting global climate benefits 
while simultaneously addressing sustainable development goals. For instance, a UNDP report on 
climate change financing states that incorporating gender issues into all aspects of climate 
change financing will “maximize the effectiveness and efficacy of climate change responses” 
(UNDP, 2011). A UNDP training module on gender and energy notes that women face differing 
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problems to men with regards to energy production and utilization of energy services that are 
linked to traditional gender roles related to cooking, cleaning, and income generation (UNDP, 
2013). As noted by Williams (2016),  
 
 “Women must face and deal with the adverse challenges of climate change with fewer personal 
and social resources than their male counterparts. Yet, women are critical actors in managing and 
maintaining their households, the community, the ecosystems and natural resources.” 
 
 To gain more of an understanding of how funds can be allocated most efficiently within a 
household to encourage the adoption of green technology, I will look at how the effect of intra-
household bargaining power differentials between men and women can be leveraged to 
encourage adoption of cleaner household technologies.4 With this, I hope to further and 
understanding of whether when given access to credit, women choose to invest in greener 
technologies disproportionately to men. 
 This paper studies factors that affect intra-household bargaining relationships that are 
reflected in consumption decisions that result in improved household outcomes, specifically with 
regards to the adoption of green technology. To do so, I use a probit model to assess the 
determinants of the adoption of a clean cooking fuel (LPG) in India. To supplement this 
econometric analysis and provide scope for future research, I will create an experimental design 
that can be used to test this theoretical model in a setting that measures whether a targeted 
increase in  access to credit (and thereby increasing a member’s bargaining power within the 
household) has an effect on the adoption of improved cookstove technology in India based on the 
gender of the recipient..  
 
                                                 
4 Here, household-level interventions aimed at reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and creating 
environmental benefits can broadly be classified into four categories: improved cookstoves (ICs), off-grid energy, 
reforestation (or alternatively, reducing deforestation), and improved agricultural technologies (including livestock). 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 The role of gender in household bargaining power and spending patterns 
 Keeping in mind the role of the household as an actor in engaging in climate change 
mitigation, I will examine different models of intra-household resource allocation – that is, the 
allocation of rights, responsibilities, and resources among members within a household – and 
their subsequent policy implications with regards to shifting patterns of consumption towards 
greener technologies. As Doss (1996) notes, households are the center of much of the economic 
decision making that goes on in an economy. The intra-household allocation of resources is 
characterized by both cooperation and conflict. Given a set of possible outcomes, household 
members (for simplicity, here the members are assumed to be the male and female adults in the 
household) have different sets of preferences for those outcomes. The outcome that is realized is 
thus dependent on each member’s relative bargaining power. Though dependent upon a range of 
factors, bargaining power can be said to largely be defined by the strength of the member’s fall-
back position, defined by Agarwal (1997) as “the outside options which determine how well-off 
she/he would be if cooperation failed.” Thus, the better a member’s outside options, the stronger 
their fall-back position, and the more bargaining power they have within the household. 
 Historically, researchers have conceptualized households through unitary models of the 
family (Becker, 1965). These models assume that households operate as a single consistent 
entity, where “household members seek to maximize utility on the basis of a set of common 
preferences represented by an aggregate utility function, and a common budget constraint” 
(Agarwal, 1997).  
 This unitary model of household allocation implies that, in terms of policy interventions, 
it would be enough to provide a cash transfer to a household irrespective of the identity of the 
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target/recipient and the desired outcome would be achieved. This framework fails to recognize 
that targeting interventions of cash transfers or increased credit access to a particular member of 
the household would increase their fall-back position, raise their bargaining power, and allow 
them to express their differentiated preference more clearly through consumption (here 
considered the household outcome). 
 Consequently, newer economic research has disaggregated preferences within the 
household to create a collective household model that acknowledges: that often income is not 
pooled; that demographic characteristics such as age, gender, and caste can influence the 
preferences of individuals within households; and that depending on differences in preferences, 
bargaining power, and information flows, cooperation can occur and render the unitary 
household model an inappropriate for analysis (Doss, 1996; Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995; 
Thomas, 1990; Thomas, 1993; Iversen et al., 2006; Ashraf, 2009; Duflo, 2003; Quisumbing and 
Maluccio, 2003). Adding context to these concerns within the framework of development issues, 
anthropological and economic literature suggests that collective household models are more 
appropriate for households in developing countries, where households do not pool incomes and 
where husbands and wives might receive differing income streams (both earned and unearned) 
that would lead them to be responsible for different household expenses (Mammen & Paxson, 
2000).  
 Given that economic analysis is gaining a propensity to disaggregate member preferences 
within households, and that many micro-credit initiatives directed at women operate on the belief 
that women invest in goods that increase household welfare, it is increasingly important to 
understand the empirical claims that giving women access to credit is economically efficient. 
That being said, programs that extend cash transfers and micro-credit to women implicitly 
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acknowledge the role that women play in the household as agents of economic change (Duflo, 
2012). A large body of empirical literature (discussed below) has looked at whether intra-
household allocation is, in fact, affected by the identity (in this case, gender) of the recipient of 
income. 
 There are two major components to interventions that aim to influence household 
dynamics: proxies for bargaining power and proxies for household outcomes. As outlined by 
Agarwal (1997), factors that influence the bargaining power of a person within a rural household 
are primarily comprised of “ownership of and control over assets, especially arable land; access 
to employment and other income-earning means; access to communal resources such as village 
commons and forests; access to traditional social support systems such as of patronage, kinship, 
caste groupings, etc.; support from NGOs;  support from the State; social perceptions about 
needs, contributions and other determinants of deservedness; and social norms.” Following from 
this, proxies for bargaining power include used in experimental studies earned income, unearned 
income (cash transfers), maternal education at low levels, labor force participation of women, 
asset ownership (where assets can include land, savings, agricultural equipment), consumer 
durables, businesses, and financial assets (Thomas, 1990; Doss, 2006; Doss, 2013). 
 Household outcome proxies largely comprise of children’s educational outcomes, 
anthropometric measurements of children’s health, budget shares spent on food, budget shares 
spent on alcohol and cigarettes, budget shares spent on household repairs, and expenditure on 
healthcare. All of the household outcome proxies measured above can be broadly said to capture 
changes in consumption – i.e., they serve as a measurement of the household’s well-being. 
Consumption is preferred to income as a proxy for well-being because budget shares and 
expenditure are bound to fluctuate less than income itself, since households tend to smooth 
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consumption over time. Additionally, consumption better reflects the expression of preference of 
individual members in a household more accurately.  
 Studies indicate that, relative to men, income and asset ownership in the hands of women 
is associated with improvements in child health and larger expenditure shares of nutrition, health, 
and housing (Thomas, 1990; Thomas, 1993). Doss (2006) uses a comprehensive measure of asset 
ownership that encompasses farmland, savings, and business activity to demonstrate that 
increasing women’s asset ownership increases budget share comprised by food and education 
(Doss, 2006). Results from Hoddinott and Haddad’s 1995 study on household behavior in Côte 
d’Ivoire suggest that, using a collective model of the household where bargaining between 
members occurs, increasing the wives’ share of income results in a greater proportion of 
household expenditure on food, while simultaneously reducing budget share spent on cigarettes 
and alcohol (Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995). Similarly, also in Côte d’Ivoire, Duflo and Udry 
(2004) find that rainfall shocks that increase the crop yields of crops cultivated by women tend to 
shift expenditures towards food consumption, whereas there is no effect of food consumption 
with shock-related output increases from crops cultivated by men. This again suggests that 
women tend to divert funds towards consumption that benefits the entire family/household. 5 
 Some studies develop the collective bargaining model further by recognizing the 
informational asymmetries that often occur within spousal relationships in households in 
developing countries, and accounting for this imbalance within their experimental setups. For 
instance, Iversen et al. (2006) find that though couples do not maximize surplus, the identity of 
the member responsible for allocation matters, and that a greater proportion of potential surplus 
                                                 
5 The literature relies on an “inferential approach” that assumes that due to a significant change in a certain outcome 
resulting from an increase in women’s bargaining power, it is safe to infer that the outcome achieved is indeed the 
preferred one (Thomas, 1990).  
Anand 
 
 
13 
was realized when women were in charge of the common income account. Ashraf (2009) tests 
the effects of informational asymmetries between male and female household heads in the 
Philippines by randomizing the level of communication between spouses. The study finds that 
conditions of asymmetric information interact with existing household roles and divisions of 
labor with regards to money management.  
 Though it is tempting to assume that mothers are more altruistic than fathers, it has been 
suggested that there might be economic reasons for mothers’ preferences that are expressed as 
increased investment in children. For instance, given the differentials between men and women 
in age at marriage and life expectancy, one possible reason for this preferential outcome could be 
that women invest more in their children’s education because they are more likely to rely on 
them into old age than their husbands (Quisumbing & Maluccio, 2003).  
  
2.2 Household-level developments in green technology 
 Having reviewed the literature on household bargaining models, I will now turn to a more 
detailed discussion of the household-level green technologies that are under the umbrella of 
improved household outcomes. Here, the consumption (adoption) of green technology within a 
household is thought of as the household outcome. Understanding the different green technology 
options available and the different benefits that can be conferred upon a household can inform 
the structure of climate mitigation interventions, as well as informing the structure of 
experiments aimed at data collection. In this section, I provide a condensed overview of 
developments in four household-level green technologies: off-grid rural electrification, 
reforestation, agricultural technologies, and improved cookstoves (ICs). Among the four, my 
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focus is on improved cookstoves, given that ICs will be incorporated into the experimental 
design presented in this paper.  
 Off-grid energy sources comprise of those that operate independently of the national 
electricity grid. Though still circumstance- and location-dependent, off-grid energy sources at the 
localized level are increasingly being considered as a viable potential means to electrify rural 
households. Off-grid energy solutions represent a somewhat optimal solution in terms of their 
ability to proliferate electricity provision with relation to a given project’s required investment, 
efficiency and quality of service (Yadoo & Cruickshank, 2012). In addition, small-scale biomass 
combustion for rural household energy use has the potential to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions (Creutzig et al., 2015). However, it must be noted that some critics have posited that 
the potential increased reliance on biofuels might actually increase GHG emissions by 
encouraging the growth of crops for fuel. 
 Reducing tropical deforestation in developing countries has the potential to significantly 
reduce the cost of the global portfolio of climate change mitigation strategies, particularly 
through the implementation of carbon payments programs (Seymour & Busch, 2016). 
Additionally, household-level research in Uganda has shown that incentivizing forest-owning 
households to change their behavior so as to reduce the amount of deforestation they engaged in 
had a significant impact on slowing the decline of forest cover in the villages, as well as 
generating program benefits that were 2.4 times as large as the program costs, making the 
intervention cost-effective as well (Jayachandran et al., 2017). 
 Improvements in agricultural technologies tend to address either the role of livestock or 
crop production. The benefits received by livestock interventions include “reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions, increases in productivity because of time saved, reductions in 
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deforestation, improvements in children and women's health as well as reductions in public 
expenditures within the health sector,” (Gill et al., 2009). With regard to crop production, studies 
show that factors that influence the household uptake of climate adaptation strategies include 
access to credit, access to information and education, government support by way of policy and 
subsidies, education, and wealth/income (Bryan et al., 2009; Igoden et al., 1990; Lin, 1991; 
Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007).  
 
2.2.1 Improved cookstoves (ICs) 
 Studies have shown that domestic cookstoves hold significant potential as a point of 
improvement in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Smith et al., 2000; Bruce et al., 
2000). For instance, Johnson et al. (2009) estimated the CO2-e (carbon dioxide equivalent) 
savings for 603 homes in Michoacán, Mexico, to find that the cost of CO2-e savings as a result of 
the adoption of the IC was US$8 per tCO2-e, which is approximately 18 times less expensive 
than solar power.6 This study, as well as others, suggests that the relative cost of US$8 per CO2-e 
abatement, in conjunction with their significant health benefits, that ICs are a viable solution to 
pursue as a relatively low-cost Black Carbon mitigation option (Johnson et al, 2009; Kar et al., 
2012). 
 A potential issue with cookstoves might lie with the way in which these technologies are 
marketed towards consumers. The focus on mitigating health risks and costs rather than potential 
environmental benefits when marketing to households might speak to a larger disconnect 
between the adoption of broader collective benefits of adopting improved technologies and the 
strategies employed to influence household decision-making or leverage existing power 
                                                 
6 For any quantity and type of greenhouse gas, CO2-e signifies the amount of CO2 that would have the equivalent 
impact on global warming. 
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dynamics within the household. Additionally, some research shows that in Bangladesh, relying 
on the communication of health benefits of ICs was not the most effective way to encourage 
adoption, since many women in rural Bangladesh do not perceive indoor air pollution as a 
significant health hazard.  
 Jeuland and Pattanayak (2012) conduct a cost-benefit analysis of cookstove adoption at 
the household level to assess potential contributing factors to poor uptake of IC technology. By 
modeling private costs and benefits and then social costs and benefits, they show that households 
switching from traditional stoves to improved stoves yield net private benefits in at least half of 
the simulations. These improved technologies included improved wood-burning, improved 
charcoal-burning, or electric stoves, LPG, and kerosene stoves, with LPG and kerosene stoves 
yielding the highest welfare gains by magnitude. Additionally, Jeuland and Pattanayak (2012) 
add the value of net value of carbon benefits to the private benefits they calculated to the 
household, and find that (using the most conservative assumptions regarding emissions savings) 
carbon subsidies are justified to promote adoption, thereby offsetting adoption costs that would 
otherwise deter adoption. They also acknowledge that their study excludes “aesthetic benefits 
and disamenities” that occur with different cooking options (Jeuland & Pattanayak, 2012). These 
benefits, along with others (including health benefits), have the potential to be disproportionately 
concentrated on women, given that women are usually responsible for cooking and food 
preparation under traditional gender roles, thus allowing for women to have an increased 
preference for adopting ICs over men. This, in conjunction with the potential for increased 
bargaining power from increased access to credit from a policy intervention, would theoretically 
make the adoption of ICs a useful specification for the study of a household’s consumption of 
green technology relative to women’s bargaining power.  
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3. MODEL 
 I have chosen to narrow the focus of this paper to the use of two proxies for bargaining 
power: the empirical analysis uses women’s education as a proxy for bargaining power, and the 
experimental design uses access to credit as a proxy for bargaining power. In both cases, the 
adoption (consumption) of improved household technology as a proxy for household outcomes. 
The experimental design outlined in this section will focus on women’s access to credit in India 
as a proxy for bargaining power, and adoption of improved cookstove (IC) technology by a given 
household as a proxy for the improved household outcome. While much of the literature has 
focused so far on outcomes related to educational attainment and nutrition, this paper expands 
the scope of household utility maximization models by incorporating the adoption of climate 
mitigating household technologies into the umbrella of improved household outcomes by using 
consumption of those goods as a proxy. 
 
3.1 Theoretical model 
 The theoretical model that I employ draws upon the work of Hoddinott & Haddad (1995) 
in their study of the influence of female income share on household expenditure using a utility 
maximization model. Hoddinott & Haddad (1995) use a Nash equilibrium model to show that as 
income share of one utility-maximizing member in the household rises, it is clearly reflected in 
the pattern of household expenditure because the share of household income spent on that 
individual’s preferred set of goods will rise. The theory suggests that if both the man and woman 
in the household derive different utilities from green technology consumption, they would realize 
different outcomes in the pursuit of utility maximization.  
 Thus, when one member’s bargaining power in the household increases, they have more 
power for their preferences to be realized and reflected in household consumption decisions over 
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the other member’s. The experimental design in this paper can be used to test this theory. By 
increasing either the man or woman’s bargaining power through access to credit from 
microfinance programs, we could test whether one has an increased propensity to purchase green 
technology for the household over the other in the pursuit of utility maximization.7 Given the 
literature that shows that women’s set of preferred outcomes is likely to be more beneficial for 
the household, I hypothesize that when green technology is included as a possible item of 
consumption, women’s set of preferred outcomes will reflect the outcome that is more beneficial 
to the household – i.e., the adoption of green technology. 
 
3.2 Empirical model  
3.2.1 Data 
 I conduct a regression analysis of the factors that influence the use of three different 
commonly used fuels in India. The data are a part of the Indian Human Development Survey 
(IHDS).8 The IHDS was conducted twice; the initial round was in 2005 (IHDS-I) and a second 
round was carried out in 2011-2012 (IHDS-II) that largely consisted of re-interviewing 
households from the initial survey. The IHDS is nationally representative, multi-topic survey of 
42,125 households in villages as well as urban neighborhoods across India. Both surveys cover 
all states and union territories in India with the exception of the Andaman & Nicobar and 
Lakshadweep islands. Data from the survey was gathered through two one-hour interviews in 
each household covered topics concerning health, education, employment, economic status, 
marriage, gender relations, social capital, and more. The data form this survey are cross-sectional 
and consist of measurements for individual observations (persons, households, districts, states, 
                                                 
7 A more detailed explanation of this theory is included in Appendix A2 for the interested reader. 
8 The Indian Human Development Survey can be found at: https://ihds.umd.edu/ 
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etc.) at a given point in time. For this analysis, I only use data from IHDS-II. More specifically, I 
use data from parts DS2 (Household) and DS3 (Eligible Women)9 of this survey.10,11 The IHDS 
surveys are particularly useful for helping analyze human development indicators across a range 
of social and economic dimensions – for instance, in this paper I analyze consumption (an 
economic outcome) by considering the roles of education, gender relations, community context, 
and economic resources. 
 Recently, the negative health impacts of traditional biomass stove (chulha) use in India 
have been realized by the general public and the government.12 Charcoal is one of the most 
commonly used fuels for biomass stoves in India, and is the only type of biomass fuel included 
in the IHDS-II survey. LPG has been shown to be the cleanest of the three fuel options, 
addressing both the issue of indoor air pollution and ambient (outdoor) air pollution 
simultaneously. Though kerosene is considered to still be cleaner than charcoal and other 
biomass, it is still has significantly negative health and environmental impacts that are not shared 
by LPG usage. As a result, the Indian government has invested heavily in LPG subsidy programs 
primarily targeting poor and middle-income households. The country has seen a significant 
increase in LPG connections, and has plans to further expand the program. Thus, I use LPG 
connections in India as a proxy for improve cookstove technology, as LPG stoves are cleaner 
than chulhas and kerosene stoves. 
                                                 
9 Here, an ‘eligible woman’ is described as an ever-married woman aged 15-49. DS3 has data from a questionnaire 
where an eligible woman in the household is the respondent. 
10 Data from DS3 were used wherever possible for consistency of responses, and data from DS2 were used if data 
from DS3 were not available. 
11 Sample weights for the household were assigned to observations in this analysis to account for differences in 
geographical population distribution. 
12 A chulha is a small earthen or brick stove that uses wood, charcoal, animal dung, or crop residue (biomass). 
Chulha use has been compared to cigarette smoking in terms of its negative individual and public health impacts. 
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 Figure 1 reflects this switch to cleaner fuels – LPG is by far the most used fuel in this 
sample in both urban and rural areas, which likely speaks to the success of the fuel subsidy 
program in encouraging people in both areas to move towards cleaner fuels. This is likely the 
result of intelligent social marketing on behalf of the programs, as well linking participation in 
these programs to financial inclusion through access to banking facilities. However, the graphs 
illustrate a lingering reliance on kerosene and charcoal among rural households, which suggests 
some difference in fuel usage characteristics based on location. This is further explored in the 
regression analysis of factors affecting LPG use later in this paper. 
 Table 2 (see Appendix) shows that when households do have to collect wood fuel for 
charcoal, over half of the women who responded have to collect it at least once a week. This 
shows that women do have to engage in the process of fuel collection frequently enough that it is 
an established part of their household routines. 
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Figure 2: Cooking Fuel Use By Main Purpose 
  
  
  
 Figure 2 is illustrative of the different uses of each fuel within the pooled sample. Among 
households that do use LPG, it is reported that its main use is for cooking, followed by a 
combination of energy-consuming activities. Kerosene, unlike LPG, is largely used for lighting. 
One possible explanation for this could be that households who have access to the LPG subsidy 
program might have switched from charcoal directly to LPG, thereby leapfrogging over the 
‘middle step’ of using kerosene. At the time of the public subsidy deployment, some households 
have presumably been using kerosene for a long time and have found the most suitable and 
efficient ways for their families to make the most use out of a given fuel – kerosene and LPG 
would be suited for this diverse set of needs. However, since the intervention focused on 
switching to LPG as a cooking fuel, it is possible that households that switched from chulhas to 
ICs primarily use LPG for cooking instead of charcoal. These households still rely on kerosene 
for other energy needs, likely because they have not had enough time to integrate LPG into other 
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energy consuming activities in their lives, and because of a lack of access to electricity. 
Additionally, most households report not using charcoal at all, but those that do report using it 
primarily for cooking. This could be supported by the fact that kerosene and charcoal are 
imperfect substitutes in terms of how they meet different energy needs. 
 
 
3.2.2 Model 
 I investigate what factors might have a significant effect on increasing the likelihood of 
the adoption of LPG for a given household, controlling for demographic, geographic, and socio-
economic factors. I ran a probit regression with a dependent variable that captures LPG usage for 
cooking, and women’s access to education as my independent variable of interest, the results of 
which are displayed in Table 3. I ran the same regressions using a linear probability model 
(LPM) as well, and the results are reported in Table 4. The directions in which the coefficients 
move is the same as in the probit model, and the coefficients for the independent variables are of 
similar magnitude. I chose to run a probit model instead of the LPM because my outcome of 
interest is coded as a binary variable ranging from 0 to 1. The probit model is thus better fitted 
for the dependent dummy variable and predicts the probability of the adoption of LPG for 
cooking.13 The model was calculated with robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity.   
 
Pr(LPGcook) = Φ(𝛽0 + 𝛽1Educ + 𝛽2Educ*Urban + 𝛽3Lincome + 𝛽4Lincome*Urban + 𝛽5Women      
               + 𝛽6Women*Urban + 𝛽7Men+ 𝛽8Age + 𝛽9Hindu + 𝛽10Urban + μ)              (1) 
 
 I used the dependent variable LPGcook, which equals 1 if the respondent reports that the 
main use of LPG in their household is for the purpose of cooking, and 0 if otherwise. The main 
                                                 
13 The results of the regression using a linear probability model (LPM) are displayed in Table 4 (Appendix 2). 
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independent variable of interest, Educ, is a proxy for bargaining power in the household. Educ 
captures the highest level of education attained by an adult woman (over 21 years old) in the 
household. I chose this variable over variables that described the education level of the 
respondent or mother-in-law (only two of the women in the household) because the households 
that report having between 0 and 3 women living in them comprise 97 percent of the sample, 
with 7.60 percent of the sample reporting that 3 women live in the household. I hypothesize that 
the coefficient on Educ will be positive and significant. 
 Demographic controls used in this regression include the log of total household income 
(Lincome), the number of adult men and women in the household over 21 years of age (Women 
and Men), and religion (coded as Hindu = 1 if the respondent identifies the head of the household 
as Hindu, and 0 if otherwise). The log of Income was used if values for Income were greater than 
or equal to 0. This was to account for the wide range in orders of magnitude for observations within 
this variable. Additionally, I chose to limit the characterization of religion to Hindi and non-Hindu, 
despite the fact that both categories comprise heterogenous groups of religious identity. I made 
this choice for two reasons: first, the vast majority of the sample reports that the head of the 
household is Hindu (81.62 percent). Moreover, in some places in India, identifying as Hindu 
translates into higher social capital and bargaining power, and different cultural norms. 
 I chose to use a probit model with robust standard errors. I report the marginal effects 
from the probit estimations instead of the estimated coefficients, for ease of interpretation. Three 
empirical models are estimated, one with the pooled sample controlling for urban/rural 
characteristics, and two that were disaggregated by urban/rural characteristics to investigate the 
effects of women’s education in areas where social norms are likely to be different and influence 
bargaining power.  
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3.2.3 Results and Limitations 
 The results of this model are presented in Table 3. The variables Educ, Lincome, and 
Women were estimated along with the interaction terms for each of them with Urban. As a result, 
the coefficients in Column 1 show the results of those three variables in the rural subsample.  
 From Column 1, the independent variable of interest, Educ, is significant in rural 
households and carries the anticipated positive sign. According to these results, the level of 
education of the adult woman in a rural household with the highest level of education is a 
positive predictor of the household’s choice to use LPG primarily for cooking. That is, an 
increase in education by 1 grade level for the most-educated woman in a rural household, 
increases the likelihood that the household uses the cleaner fuel alternative by 3.66 percent, 
significant at the 1 percent level. The results in Columns 2 and 3 support this hypothesis as well. 
In urban households, an increase in education by 1 grade level for the most-educated woman in 
the household increases the likelihood that the household uses the cleaner fuel alternative by 4.61 
percent. This coefficient is smaller than for rural households. Moreover, the coefficient on the 
difference between the urban and rural effects is also significant, showing that the effect of 
increasing women’s education (and subsequently, bargaining power) on LPG use is magnified in 
rural areas when compared to urban households. This suggests that perhaps due to prevailing 
social norms, the marginal effect of a woman having more bargaining power in terms of more 
education is greater in areas where it is less common for women to have an education.  
 This supports my hypothesis that increasing a woman’s bargaining power within the 
household does increase the likelihood that the improved household outcome will be achieved, 
specifically using the adoption of LPG (the cleanest option, the other two being charcoal and 
kerosene) as the proxy for the improved household outcome. 
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 Additionally, the control variables Lincome, Age, Women and Men are statistically 
significant. Like Educ, Lincome is interacted with Urban to give Lincome*Urban. The 
coefficients in Column 1 indicate that an increase in income corresponds to a 3.49 percent 
increase in the likelihood of a rural household adopting LPG as its primary cooking fuel. 
Similarly, the coefficients in column 3 indicate that an increase in income corresponds to a 7.40 
percent increase in the likelihood of an urban household adopting LPG as its primary cooking 
fuel. However, the difference between these two is not significant. This could perhaps be due to 
social and cultural factors having more of an influence in households making the decision to use 
LPG or not, and goes against some literature on the income-energy ladder (Reddy, 2004). 
 Surprisingly, having a higher number of women in the household significantly decreases 
the probability of using LPG as a cooking fuel by approximately 1 percent in rural households, 
by 3.6 percent in urban areas, and by 0.7 percent overall. The difference between the effect of 
this variable in urban and rural households is not significant. Conversely, having more adult men 
in the house significantly increases the probability of using LPG by 1.37 percent overall. Having 
a Hindu-identifying head of household significantly decreases the probability of using LPG as 
the primary cooking fuel in the household by 4.78 percent overall.  
 Finally, the differences in magnitude of LPG adoption between urban and rural areas is 
illustrated by the coefficient on the variable Urban. Living in an urban area increases the 
likelihood of adopting LPG as the primary cooking fuel by 50.1 percent, significant at the 1 
percent level. This supports the initial hypothesis and previous literature on the subject. The 
magnitude of the coefficient confirms my initial motivation for disaggregating the sample to see 
whether the independent variable of interest and other control variables have different effects/the 
same effects of differing magnitudes in both settings. 
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  Within this analysis, there are limitations to the model I have presented. First, the 
empirical model in this paper largely relies on self-reported data, which is subject to a bias. The 
model itself would have better reflected preferences of fuel choices had an ordered probit model 
been used as is frequent in the literature (Reddy, 2004), however I did not have enough 
observations from subsamples using charcoal and kerosene to be able to yield analysis of 
significant power. Additionally, the proxies chosen for improved household outcomes are far 
from perfect. It is difficult to gather data directly about improved environmental outcomes. For 
this survey I used the adoption of the cleaner fuel (LPG) as a proxy for the improved outcome 
without actually quantifying the benefit to the household, since I assumed (based off of the 
literature) that an improved outcome would follow form the switch from biomass to LPG. 
Additionally, if I had access to a better proxy that measured the actual environmental benefit, it 
would have been worthwhile to use a fixed effects model using the IHDS-I and IHDS-II that 
could track household outcomes over time, since many of the IHDS-II in 2011-2012 households 
were ones that were re-interviewed from the IHDS-I in 2005. This, in conjunction with a more 
specific proxy for women’s empowerment, could yield more robust insights about causal 
relationships between women’s bargaining power and the adoption of green technology. Some of 
these concerns are addressed in through the creation of the experimental design.  
 
4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
4.1. Motivation 
 As pointed out by Zimmerman (2012), most studies that seek to identify instances of 
gender discrimination in the allocation of household outcomes such as consumption, health, or 
expenditures are constrained by the unavailability of data. Household consumption and 
expenditure data is usually only available at the household level, rather than at the individual 
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level.  Furthermore, bargaining power as a variable is unobservable – these studies must also use 
proxies for bargaining power, in addition to those used for preferences. As noted by Agarwal 
(1997), income can often serve as an endogenous factor in outcome differentials, obscuring the 
causality between exogenous increases in earned income and bargaining power in the household. 
Randomized control trials (RCTs), where participants are randomly assigned to control or 
treatment groups, are one way to overcome this issue and reveal the intricacies of decision-
making processes within households more clearly (Doss, 2013).  
 These issues can and have been addressed in a few ways. The problem of endogeneity 
has been addressed in experiments by using a ‘natural experiment’ framework, where a policy 
change or exogenous change to income outside of the control of the household creates natural 
control and treatment groups (Duflo, 2003; Qian, 2008). Kusago and Barham (2001) directly 
surveyed household members on how they would spend an extra $40 on different expenditure 
categories, and created a measure of preference heterogeneity to include within their model. 
Similarly, RCTs are another method of circumventing the problem of endogeneity to some 
extent. Many conditional cash transfer programs have utilized the design of RCTs to test their 
efficacy.  
 To address the data and endogeneity constraints within my own empirical model, I 
incorporate a theoretical experimental design based on previous research in intra-household 
allocation to move beyond these limitations.  
 The experiment would aim to test whether a targeted increase in access to credit (i.e., the 
increase in access to credit is directed either towards the man or the woman in the household) 
results in a significant difference in the rates of ICs adoption between men and women in rural 
areas in India. The hypothesis the experiment operates on is based on the theoretical model 
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outlined above. I hypothesize that given increased access to credit, women would 
disproportionately increase household budget expenditure on ICs relative to men. Increased 
access to credit has been chosen as the specific intervention to address credit market 
inefficiencies given the choice of technology.  
 ICs were chosen specifically because of the asymmetrical distribution of benefits of 
adoption to women, thus creating a preference differential that could be realized as a result of 
increased bargaining power (Jeuland & Pattanayak, 2012). Subsequently, as Jack (2011) notes, 
access to credit is needed most when the upfront cost of technology adoption is highest – this is 
by and large true for the financing of stoves. Previous studies have largely used education, 
income or asset ownership as proxies for increasing women’s bargaining power. Another such 
proxy is increasing women’s access to credit, which could have similar effects to that of 
increased earned income. This is a particularly salient proxy given the high up-front costs of ICs, 
which would require most consumers (particularly rural ones) to have access to consumer 
finance to make the purchase. Microfinance organizations are well-positioned to address the 
constraints that women face in borrowing from commercial banks, such as lack of access to 
collateral, lack of asset ownership, social norms, lack of information, and other institutional and 
legal barriers. Though there is a lack of academic consensus on whether microfinance does 
‘empower’ women, it has been shown to have a positive impact on income and serves as a useful 
tool for the promotion of new technologies (UN, 2009). Microfinance organizations are able to 
address the constraints women face more specifically through group-lending programs. 
4.2 Specification 
 The experimental set up here would thus follow the RCT design, wherein a sample of 
households would be randomly sorted into two groups with similar socioeconomic 
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characteristics and culturally-based influencing factors (such as income, education levels, 
religion, and caste – which would be disaggregated into high caste and lower caste 
communities). The nature of the intervention would be a 2x2 design as follows: one group would 
be subject to an intervention where women are given increased access to credit (1), and the other 
would be subject to an intervention where  men are given increased access to credit (2) in the 
form of a loan. Within groups (1) and (2), each group would be further stratified into a treatment 
and control group, based on our subgroups of interest – i.e. gender. So, in group (1) there would 
be two randomly assigned groups of households: one group where women are given increased 
access to credit (treatment group 1) and another group where women are not given increased 
access to credit (control group 1). Similarly in group (2), two groups would exist – one where 
men are given access to credit (treatment group 2) and another where men are not given access to 
credit (control group 2).  
 Additionally, to ensure that the option of adopting green technology is incorporated into 
the household’s budgeting process, the experiment would be linked to a menu of consumption 
options. Both treatment and control groups would receive a menu of options to choose from, 
which would include the improved cookstove as a possible component of budget allocation. The 
menu of options would be catered to the economic (income, education) and socio-cultural 
(religion, caste) characteristics of the community, as high-caste, highly educated rural 
households would likely have different potential baskets of consumption than low-caste, low-
income rural households. This would help ensure that the increased access in credit is directed 
towards incentivizing the green technology, and not influencing consumption in general.  
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Figure 5: 2x2 experimental setup  
 The next point of concern is the level of randomization in the study. Randomization is 
necessary to ensure that there is no contamination across groups as a result of treatment. In this 
experimental design, I would need to ensure that the risk of treatment groups communicating 
with one another about having received the increased access to credit is minimal, as this would 
affect how both treatment and control groups would respond to the intervention. The next 
question to address would be at what level the groups could be randomized so as to generate a 
credible test. 
 The sample size and level at which the sample is randomized is important both for 
analytical and practical reasons. Treatment and subsequent data collection through interviews is 
expensive, thus the sample size needs to be optimized. Furthermore from a statistical standpoint, 
the significance of the true effect of treatment (measured through averages in the treatment and 
control group) depend both on the magnitude of the true effect, the sample size, and the 
Group
Women 
given access 
to credit
Treatment Control
Men given 
access to 
credit
Treatment Control
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homogeneity of the population.14 Ideally, on average, the sample size would be large enough that 
observable and unobservable characteristics of the treatment and control populations are the 
same. 
 In this experiment, the treatment level is at the household – one person in each household 
receives the intervention, so no two individuals within the same household would be recipients 
of the increased credit flow. Randomization could occur at: 
1. The household/group level, where households in the same village are randomly selected 
to form treatment and control groups within the same village. 
2. The village level, where a certain number of households are randomly selected within 
each village to receive treatment across villages in the same sub-district (village 
cluster).15 Here, the intensity of treatment can be varied across villages (i.e. the number 
of treatment households can be increased or decreased across villages). Other strategies 
include assigning all villages partial treatment (where 50% of households receive 
treatment) or assign full treatment to some (say 50%) villages. 
3. The sub-district level, where a certain number of villages in a sub-district are randomly 
selected to have all the households as recipients of the treatment while all the households 
in the other villages in the sub-district are randomly chosen to be the control group. 
 As the scope of randomization widens, a trade-off begins to appear. The smaller the 
scope, the easier it is to collect reliable data and information through interviews – however, 
keeping the scope of the experiment small runs the risk of cross-contamination from 
informational spillovers. For instance, if the intervention is randomized at the household level, 
                                                 
14 Here, the true effect tested would be the increase in women’s propensity to spend on cleaner cooking 
technologies. 
15 In India, the hierarchy of government administration is organized (in order of decreasing geographical scope) at 
the following levels: national, state, district, sub-district (village clusters), and village. Here, a district 
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non-recipient households in the same village might find out and be dissatisfied, thereby 
reiterating the practical constraints of the experimental setup. To mitigate this potential 
dissatisfaction, recipients should either be chosen arbitrarily or randomly, or some combination 
of the two. Another potential concern is cross-contamination through crossovers (movement to 
treatment or control groups). This is less of a concern since it would be difficult for members of 
recipient households to move into non-recipient households or vice versa, and it would also be 
difficult for entire families to move to or from recipient villages, depending on the level of 
randomization. 
 The power test also needs to be taken into account when selecting sample size and the 
level of randomization. As demonstrated by Thornton (2011), if the experiment is randomized at 
the individual/household level, a large minimum detectable effect (MDE) of 0.5 is achievable 
with either a) a minimum of 144 responses with under 50% treatment and full compliance or b) a 
minimum of 576 observations with 50% compliance. Moving away from individual 
randomization results in a loss in precision from an increase in MDE. 
 Taking into consideration both practical and statistical concerns regarding randomization 
and its limits, I would recommend that the intervention be randomized at the village level (level 
2) so as to provide flexibility in treatment intensity/administration; achieve a balance within the 
trade-off between ease of data collection and risk of spillover cross-contamination; and maintain 
realistic expectations about budgetary limitations. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 The primary goal of this paper is to incorporate the rigorous body of empirical research 
on household bargaining models into the architecture of climate change financing. International 
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political and development agendas are beginning to emphasize the need for access to clean and 
affordable energy not merely as an afterthought in project planning, but at the heart of any 
reasonable sustainable development initiative moving forward, particularly given the pressing 
need for climate change mitigation in light of the recent IPCC report. This is evidenced not only 
by the inclusion of ‘Affordable and Clean Energy’ as Goal 7 of the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals, but also by the focus of recent policy brief aiming to integrate issues of 
gender and clean energy access into the broader global development agenda. (UN, 2015; UNDP, 
2011; UNDP, 2013). 
 Many households in developing countries face the barrier of high up-front costs standing 
between them and the adoption of green technologies that have the potential to confer improved 
environmental outcomes to the community at large, as well as improved health and livelihood 
outcomes within the household itself. Though the jury is still out on its efficacy, microfinance is 
often used as a means to bridge that funding gap – more specifically, microcredit poses one 
possible avenue to facilitate the adoption of these technologies.  
 There seems to be a missing link between empirical literature on improving household 
outcomes and policy initiatives that recognize that women in developing countries are 
simultaneously on the receiving end of the burden of climate change and in the best position to 
improve environmental outcomes at the household level. With this paper, I aim to both motivate 
the need for more robust empirical research linking the two with my own economic analysis, as 
well as provide the first steps for an empirical design that could provide the basis of an 
experimental design to collect data that would help test this theory in the real world, and gather 
data on the realized outcomes of increasing women’s access to credit. 
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 These limitations in the data and empirical model in this paper can be addressed through 
the collection of survey data from the experimental design outlined above. Avenues for future 
research could expand on this experimental design to test for improved outcomes with other 
green household technologies, such as reforestation initiatives, off-grid solar energy, and 
agricultural technology improvements. This might be especially pertinent for technologies where 
improved household outcomes and environmental benefits are easier to measure and analyze. 
Moreover, I aim to have challenged ideas of women in developing countries as a vulnerable 
populations with limited means and agency, as well as assumptions that these same women are, 
by virtue of being on the receiving end of the adverse outcomes of climate change, able to secure 
the desirable outcome of adopting greener technology within their households as a part of their 
rational consumption choices. 
 Policy that aims to finance the adoption of green technology for households must ground 
itself in an evidence-based understanding of the complex dynamics that shape large consumption 
decisions, and the gathering of that evidence must flow from economic theory. In providing this 
theoretical and empirical background to my experimental design, it is my hope to gain a more 
expansive empirical understanding of women’s role in climate change mitigation strategies.  
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Appendix 
A1: Tables 
 
Table 1: Highest female adult education level in household 
Highest female adult 
education 
Freq. 
(Pooled) 
Percent Freq. 
(Rural) 
Percent 
(Rural) 
Freq. 
(Urban) 
Percent 
(Urban) 
None 14,949 37.82 12,352 45.85 2,596 20.64 
1st class 169 0.43 150 0.56 20 0.16 
2nd class 537 1.36 415 1.54 122 0.97 
3rd class 845 2.14 635 2.36 210 1.67 
4th class 1,138 2.88 846 3.14 292 2.32 
5th class 3,207 8.12 2,345 8.70 863 6.86 
6th class 1,035 2.62 705 2.62 330 2.62 
7th class 2,001 5.06 1,284 4.77 717 5.70 
8th class 2,851 7.21 1,928 7.16 923 7.34 
9th class 2,662 6.74 1,636 6.07 1,027 8.16 
Secondary (10th class) 3,513 8.89 1,842 6.84 1,671 13.28 
11th class 516 1.3 305 1.13 211 1.68 
High secondary (12th class) 2,677 6.77 1,367 5.07 1,310 10.41 
Bachelor’s 2,210 5.59 754 2.80 1,456 11.57 
Above bachelor’s 1,212 3.07 378 1.40 835 6.63 
Total 39,523  100 26,941 
 
100 12,582 
 
100 
Note: The sample sizes for urban and rural subsamples are lower than the full sample used in the 
regression. This is because the IHDS-II is a survey, and restricting based on different variables results in 
observations being dropped due to some questions being left unanswered by respondents. 
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Table 2: Frequency of fuel collection (adult women) 
FuelFreq Freq. Percent    
Daily 2,724 22.28 
Weekly 6,825 55.82 
Monthly 1,728 14.13 
Quarterly 584 4.78 
Yearly 365 2.99 
Total 12,226 100 
Note: The sample size is lower than the full sample used in the regression. This is because the IHDS-II is 
a survey, and restricting based on different variables results in observations being dropped due to some 
questions being left unanswered by respondents. 
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Table 3: Determinants of LPG Use (Probit Model) 
Note: Probit estimations. The reported coefficients in columns (1) and (2) are marginal effects. Standard 
errors in parenthesis. (***, **, *) indicates statistical significance at the (1, 5, 1) level. Dependent variable 
= 1 if LPG fuel is used primarily for cooking. Coefficients in (1) denote effect of the interacted 
independent variables on the dependent variable for the rural population (i.e., where Urban==0). 
Coefficients in (2) denote the isolated effect of the interaction term, i.e. the difference in the effect on the 
dependent variable between the urban and rural subsamples for interacted variables. Coefficients in (3) 
denote the effect of the interacted independent variables on the dependent variable for the urban 
population (i.e., where Urban==1). Column (4) shows the effect of the independent variable on the full 
sample, and is estimated by running the probit model without the interaction terms. 
 
 
 Rural Interacted 
(1) 
Urban Effect 
(2) 
Urban   
(3) 
Pooled Sample 
(4) 
Educ 0.0366***   0.0261*** 
 (0.00106)   (0.000637) 
Educ*Urban  -0.0203*** 0.0461***  
  (0.00138) (0.002512)  
Lincome 0.0349***   0.0256*** 
 
(0.00459)   (0.002220) 
Lincome*Urban  -0.00861 0.07403***  
  (0.00650) (0.01324)  
Women -0.0102*   -0.00671* 
 
(0.00616)   (0.004040) 
Women*Urban  -0.00265 -0.03627**  
  (0.00798) (0.01652)  
Men 0.0137*** 0.0137*** 0.0137*** 0.0128*** 
 
(0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00393) (0.00341) 
Age 0.00331*** 0.00331*** 0.00331*** 0.00269*** 
 (0.00033) (0.00033) (0.00033) (0.000264) 
Hindu -0.0478*** -0.0478*** -0.0478*** -0.0423*** 
 
(0.00844) (0.00844) (0.00844) (0.00706) 
Urban 0.501*** 0.501*** 0.501*** 0.253*** 
 (0.06580) (0.06580) (0.06580) (0.0066) 
Pseudo R2 0.1917 0.1917 0.1917 0.1917 
Observations 39,430 39,430 39,430 39,430 
Anand 
 
 
42 
Table 4: Determinants of LPG Use (Linear Probability Model) 
Note: LPM estimations. The reported coefficients in columns (1) and (2) are marginal effects. Standard 
errors in parenthesis. (***, **, *) indicates statistical significance at the (1, 5, 1) level. Dependent variable 
= 1 if LPG fuel is used primarily for cooking. Coefficients in (1) denote effect of the interacted 
independent variables on the dependent variable for the rural population (i.e., where Urban==0). 
Coefficients in (2) denote the isolated effect of the interaction term, i.e. the difference in the effect on the 
dependent variable between the urban and rural subsamples for interacted variables. Coefficients in (3) 
denote the effect of the interacted independent variables on the dependent variable for the urban 
population (i.e., where Urban==1). Column (4) shows the effect of the independent variable on the full 
sample, and is estimated by running the LPM without the interaction terms. 
  
 Rural Interacted 
(1) 
Urban Effect 
(2) 
Urban   
(3) 
Pooled Sample 
(4) 
Educ 0.0313***   0.0332*** 
 (0.00086)   (0.000599) 
Educ*Urban -0.0140*** -0.0203*** 0.0173***  
 (0.00126) (0.00138) (0.000925)  
Lincome 0.0254***   0.0399*** 
 
(0.00244)   (0.002360) 
Lincome*Urban 0.00286 -0.00861 0.02831***  
 (0.00540) (0.00650) (0.004847)  
Women -0.0066   -0.0208*** 
 
(0.00500)   (0.004150) 
Women*Urban -0.00603 -0.00265 -0.01263**  
 (0.00733) (0.00798) (0.00592)  
Men 0.0122*** 0.0122*** 0.0122*** 0.0122*** 
 
(0.00341) (0.00341) (0.00341) (0.00341) 
Age 0.00284*** 0.00284*** 0.00284*** 0.00284*** 
 (0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00026) 
Hindu -0.0418*** -0.0418*** -0.0418*** -0.0418*** 
 
(0.00705) (0.00705) (0.00705) (0.00705) 
Urban 0.322*** 0.322*** 0.322*** -0.195*** 
 (0.05980) (0.05980) (0.05980) -0.0249 
Constant -0.218*** -0.218*** -0.218*** -0.218*** 
R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
Observations 39,430 39,430 39,430 39,430 
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A2: Summary statistics 
 
Variable name      Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LPGcook 1 if respondent reports 
that the main use of 
LPG in household is 
cooking, 0 if otherwise 
0.3490 0.4766 0 1 
LPGfuel 1 if household uses 
LPG for any purpose, 0 
if otherwise (DS2) 
0.4397 0.4964 0 1 
Educ Highest education level 
attained by an adult 
woman in household 
(DS3) 
5.486 5.1780 0 16 
Income Total household income 
(DS3) 
125301 20300 100 11400000 
LIncome Log of household 
income 
11.23 1.0011 4.605 16 
Women No. of adult women in 
HH (DS3) 
1.602 0.8166 0 9 
Men No. of adult men in HH 
(DS3) 
1.513 0.9103 0 9 
Age Age measured in years 22.72 10.323 1 62 
Hindu 1 if head of household’s 
religion is Hindu, 0 if 
otherwise (DS2) 
0.8207 0.3836 0 1 
Urban 1 if urban household, 0 
if rural household 
(DS3) 
0.3208 0.4668 0 1 
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A3: Theoretical model  
Assume that there exists a multi-member household where decisions on expenditure are made by 
two utility-maximizing members, the man (m) and woman (w). Hoddinott & Haddad (1995) use 
a Nash equilibrium model to show that as income share of one member in the household rises, it 
is clearly reflected in the pattern of household expenditure because the share of household 
income spent on that individual’s preferred set of goods will rise.  
       max UW (gt,  ~gtm, ~gtf) subject to  * (~gtm, gt) ≤ yf 
Similarly, max UM (gt,  ~gtf, ~gtm) subject to  * (~gtf, gt) ≤ ym 
 
Where  
 UW is the utility of the woman in the household 
 UM is the utility of the man in the household 
 gt is the purchase of green technology 
 ~gtm is a vector of the purchase of non-green technology goods made from the man’s 
 income. The woman takes as a given when making decisions to maximize her utility. 
 ~gtf is a vector of the purchase of non-green technology goods made from the woman’s 
 income 
  is the associated vector of prices associated with non-green technology goods 
 yf is the woman’s earned income 
 ym is the man’s income. 
 
 While Hoddinott & Haddad (1995) use a vector of purchases and their corresponding 
prices to compute preference, I am assuming a simpler model that only takes into account the 
preferences of men and women with regard to the purchase of green technology. If both m and w 
derive different utilities from green technology consumption, they would realize different 
outcomes in the pursuit of utility maximization. Thus, when one member’s bargaining power in 
the household increases, they have more power for their preferences to be realized and reflected 
in household consumption decisions over the other member’s. The experimental design in this 
paper can be used to test this theory. By increasing either m or w's bargaining power through 
access to credit from microfinance programs, we could test whether one has an increased 
propensity to purchase green technology for the household over the other in the pursuit of utility 
maximization. 
 
